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Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine in late-February 2022 triggered a swift response on
the part of the Swedish churches. The leaders of, for example, the Swedish Roman Catholic
diocese, the Swedish Pentecostal churches, the Uniting Church in Sweden (Equmeniakyrkan),
and the Lutheran Church of Sweden expressed their sympathy with the Ukrainian people and
their feelings of distress at an already troublesome situation that now had taken a turn for the
worse. 1 The nightmares of full-scale war had descended upon Europe once again. Already on
February 24, the presidium of the Christian Council of Sweden (an ecumenical body which
counts among its members not only the major Protestant churches, the Roman Catholic Church
but also most of the Orthodox and Oriental churches active in Sweden) joined in the global
outcry against the invasion. They expressed their “deep concern” and that they “shared the
sorrow and distress of the people who now must leave their homes, who will get injured or will
die.” Yet, war should not have struggle between churches as its consequence: “The dialog
between Russian and Ukrainian churches continues through the ecumenical networks. We
believe in continued intersession, dialogue and that peace is the road to peace.” Inspired by a
call issued by Pope Francis, the Council recommended that the following Ash Wednesday
(March 2) was to be observed as a day of prayer and fasting for the people of Ukraine. 2 The
https://www.katolsktmagasin.se/2022/02/24/halsning-till-alla-troende-i-stockholms-katolska-stift-medanledning-av-kriget-i-ukraina/; https://equmeniakyrkan.se/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ie-nyhetsbrev-2203.pdf;
https://www.pingst.se/ukraina/. See also recorded message by Church of Sweden primate, Antje Jacklén, at
https://vimeo.com/689415946 [accessed 6/9/22].
2
“djup oro”; “delar smärtan och sorgen med människor som måste fly, som skadas och döda”; “genom de
ekumeniska nätverken fortsätter dialogen med ryska och ukrainska kyrkor. Vi tror fortsatt på förbön, dialog och
1
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Council’s fundamental commitment to dialogue did not deter the presidium from later issuing
a strongly phrased protest (published in one of the major Swedish newspapers) against
Patriarch Kirill’s support for the invasion. The head of the Moscow Patriarchate is here accused
of exposing a “ghastly theology” which is used to legitimize an unlawful invasion that cannot,
by any means, be justified. By this action, Patriarch Kirill “hides the richness of the Orthodox
theological tradition,” and, indeed, “the Christian message of Jesus Christ the Prince of Peace,
who choose the path of love and non-violence.” 3
On the part of the individual churches, there have been many services and calls to prayer
for the situation in Ukraine (including a digital one at the Church of Sweden’s “web of
prayer”). 4 Ukrainian refugees have received the support of local congregations on numerous
occasions (it should however be noted that the number of refugees coming to Sweden so far
has been relatively modest), 5 but it is primarily through the churches’ various aid organizations
that they have been able to offer direct assistance to those who have suffered the tragic
consequences of this war. Act Church of Sweden, Caritas, Diakonia, and the Pentecostal
Mission have conducted public fundraising campaigns and engaged in various efforts of onsite measures to aid Ukrainian refugees. 6 Relief has been provided through the channels offered
by large-scale aid organizations, but sometimes more informal conduits have been used to help.
It should be noted that many of the Swedish evangelical churches established links with similar
religious groups in Ukraine already during the Soviet era. 7 These bonds of friendship can now
be utilized to offer support in a time of need.
During the spring of 2022, it became obvious that the war in Ukraine was to have a
fundamental impact on Swedish politics. Sweden’s position of neutrality was reconsidered
against the backdrop of the tragedy that was unfolding in the European south-east. On May 16,
att fred är vägen till fred.” https://www.skr.org/uttalande-fran-sveriges-kristna-rads-presidium-gallande-kriget-iukraina/ [accessed 6/9/22]. All translations mine.
3
“fasansfull teologi”; “döljer den ortodoxa teologins stora rikedom … det kristna budskapet om fredsfursten Jesus
Kristus som valde kärlekens och ickevåldets väg.” https://www.expressen.se/debatt/rysslands-patriark-drarevangeliet-i-smutsen/ [accessed 6/9/22].
4
https://be.svenskakyrkan.se/fred/. See also, for example, https://equmeniakyrkan.se/bon-for-ukraina/;
https://katolskakyrkan.se/aktuellt/stiftsnyheter/2022/valbesokt-vallfard-till-marielund-med-bon-om-fred-iukraina [accessed 7/9/22]
5
See
for
example
https://www.sandaren.se/nyhet/forsamlingar-fortsatter-hjalpa-flyktingarna;
https://www.dn.se/sverige/flydde-kriget-i-ukraina-nu-vill-hon-hjalpa-dem-som-kommer-efter/ [sites accessed
7/9/22].
6
https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/act/nyheter/act-svenska-kyrkan-agerar-for-ukraina (a website in English);
https://www.caritas.se/nyhetsarkiv/?year=2022&month=3;
https://www.diakonia.se/aktuellt/nu-ar-irina-ochhennes-barn-i-sakerhet/; https://www.pingst.se/nyheter/ukraina/ [accessed 7/9/22]
7
K. Lundström, K. Ahlstrand, J.-Å. Alvarsson, and G. Janzon (eds), (2021). Svensk mission och kyrkorna som
växt fram. Skellefteå: Artos, pp. 165–69.
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2022, Swedish government decided to submit a formal bid to join NATO. Over the last couple
of years Swedish defense policy has step by step drawn towards an ever closer alignment to
NATO, with considerable military co-operation with NATO forces and, above all, the USA. 8
These moves were by and large triggered by increasing tensions in the Baltic and Arctic
regions. It was increasingly recognized that Sweden, and its eastern neighbors, were in an
increasingly vulnerable position. Collaboration and bi-lateral agreements seemed to be the way
to provide the stability that this situation called for. However, the decision to join NATO
represents a fundamental change in the Swedish political landscape. Owing to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, public opinion drifted significantly towards a pro-membership attitude
during the spring of 2022. To leading politicians, Finland’s choice to leave its neutral status
seemed to turn a revision of Sweden’s position into a bare necessity.
How did the Swedish churches respond to this course of event, which, gradually uprooted
long held opinions about Sweden’s position in the global political landscape? By and large, the
churches have remained reticent about “the NATO issue.” Even though the Swedish churches
are no strangers to commenting on international politics (what has been written above offers a,
perhaps extreme, case in point), they have in general refrained from making direct remarks on
Sweden’s geopolitical situation. The dominant Swedish church, the Lutheran Church of
Sweden (until the turn of the century, the established, national, church) declared, however, its
attitude vis-à-vis Sweden’s relation to NATO already in 2016. This decision was occasioned
by a motion from one of the members of the Church of Sweden’s national synod (kyrkomöte).
The proposer had requested a protest from the Board of the National Synod (kyrkostyrelsen) in
relation to recent issues of Swedish foreign policy. In particular the proposition singles out
Sweden’s recent “participation in unprovoked aggression against foreign countries” (a
reference to Sweden’s participation in the NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011) for criticism,
but also urges the Board to address the Swedish Parliament regarding the question of a future
NATO membership. According to the proposition, NATO is to be shunned by Sweden at all
costs, since it is “an alliance for war.” 9 However, the national synod rejected both suggestions.
After rehearsing the contents of the Church of Sweden’s recent position paper on “a just peace”
See for example, M. Nilsson, (2009). “Amber Nine: NATO’s Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the
Incorporation of Sweden in NATO’s Infrastructure.” Journal of Contemporary History, 44(2), 287–307.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009408101252; C. Wagnsson, (2011). “A security community in the making?
Sweden
and
NATO
post-Libya.” European
Security, 20(4),
585–603.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2011.633514.
9
“Deltagande i oprovocerade anfallskrig mot främmande länder”; “en allians för krig.”
https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/filer/Mot%202016_006.pdf [accessed 19/8/22]. For the decision of the synod, see
https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/filer/Protokoll_166_2016.pdf [accessed 19/8/22].
8
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(issued March 16, 2016) and several recent decisions on related topics by the national synod, 10
the committee preparing a reply to this exhortation declared that it was “not within the Church
of Sweden’s area of competence and responsibility” to offer opinions on political questions
such as Sweden’s relation to NATO. 11 In the decision the committee resorts to Swedish
bureaucratic terminology. The term “competence” is used to denote the areas in which, for
example, a government agency has been granted mandate to decide. Even though the
terminology may be seen as slightly misleading, the decision of the committee, and
subsequently by the national synod itself, is a clear expression of the church’s unwillingness to
involve itself in matters of foreign and defense policy. This decision reaches back to a situation
when the ties between the national, Lutheran, church and the Swedish state were more strongly
knit. Even though considerable liberty to express opinions on matters of politics had been given
even to representatives of the “state church” during the twentieth century, foreign policy was
tacitly understood to be strictly “off limits” for church officials. That the national church should
publicly express opinions on matters of foreign politics that run counter to the decisions of the
Swedish government was inconceivable. That leading representatives of the national church
occasionally could raise an opposing voice in private, or at informal gatherings, is another
matter.
During the spring of 2022, the Church of Sweden could therefore reach back to this earlier
statement when pressed to have an opinion on the recent political development. In the leading
church periodical, Kyrkans tidning, a press officer of the Church of Sweden repeated the
decision of 2016. In this communication the position of the national synod was further
explored: the submission of a membership application “isn’t a pastoral matter, or something
for us to hold a joint opinion about. If Christians are worried about the associated dangers, it’s
up to local congregations to counsel them.” 12
Yet, there are, of course, different and differing voices within the Swedish Christian
landscape. Public statements expressing a whole-heartedly positive attitude are hard to come
by. Världen idag, an organ of the Swedish Christian right, comes closest. A lead article,

For these decisions, see https://km.svenskakyrkan.se/km-2001/skrivelser/2001-8/KsSkr2001-8.shtml.html;
https://km.svenskakyrkan.se/km-2001/betankanden/EU20015R.shtml.html#TopOfPage;
https://km.svenskakyrkan.se/tcrot/km/2005/skrivelser/e_KsSkr_20055_Redovisning_vald_II.shtml.html#TopOfPage [accessed 30/8/22].
11
“inte
ligger
inom
Svenska
kyrkans
ansvarsoch
kompetensområde.”
See
https://www.svenskakyrkan.se/filer/Kl%202016-07.pdf [accessed 19/8/2022]
12
As quoted and translated in the (English) Church Times, see https://churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2022/20may/news/world/finnish-and-swedish-churches-reticent-about-formal-bid-to-join-nato [accessed 23/8/22]
10
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published towards the end of March, declares that the newspaper had not “once and for all
made up its mind” concerning how or if Sweden should form a closer relationship with NATO.
The pros and cons seem evident to the writer:
We have shown support for the need to secure military assistance in a time when our
country, due to decades of political naivety, stand poorly equipped. We could benefit
from NATO’s military muscle. At the same time, we have previously demonstrated the
drawbacks of abandoning our alliance-free position; a NATO-membership not only
offers military securities, it comes with a duty to assist other countries in the case of war.
However, according to this article, the fundamental flaw of national politics is that Sweden has
long “been at war with a far greater power.” According to this article, the possible military
security that a NATO-membership could provide will be of little significance if the nations’
“spiritual defenses” are not simultaneously strengthened. 13
Within the Church of Sweden there have been occasional voices of outright protest. Above
all members of the “progressive group” (Vänstern i Svenska kyrkan) within the national synod
has been moving for a revision of the church’s position on this issue. So far, they have been
unsuccessful. When asked why this is a matter for the Church of Sweden, the chairperson of
this grouping stated that
the Church of Sweden has a strong voice in our society. It is Sweden’s largest memberorganization which has invested considerably in working for peace and reconciliation,
ecumenically and internationally. If you are a part of society, you have a right to an
opposing voice on any matter. The Church of Sweden has much to contribute in the present
situation. 14
A more negative attitude has also been implicitly voiced by Karin Wiborn, assistant
president of the Uniting Church. When commenting on a recent survey of pastors’ attitudes
towards a possible future NATO-membership (which indicated that there was an approximate
50-50 split in pastors’ attitudes towards a possible NATO-membership), she declared her belief
that NATO should not be seen as a “proactive way to peace.” She expresses a mild

“har vi inte tagit definitiv ställning”; “Vi har visat förståelse för behovet av att säkra upp militär hjälp i en tid
när vi i vårt land – på grund av decennier av naiva politiska beslut – står väldigt dåligt rustade. Här har Nato
militära muskler som vi kunde ha nytta av. Samtidigt har vi visat på baksidorna med att överge alliansfriheten,
hur ett medlemskap i Nato inte bara ger militär garanti utan också en plikt att rycka in och hjälpa andra länder i
händelse av krig”; “Sverige ligger redan i krig med en mycket större makt”; “andliga försvar.”
https://www.varldenidag.se/ledare/nato-racker-inte-for-ett-sverige-i-krig-medgud/repvbu!lVmzS2WuSh@MEPsxYrsPiQ/ [accessed 26/8/22]
14
“Svenska kyrkan är ju en stark röst i samhället, det är Sveriges största medlemsorganisation, och man har ett
stort fredsarbete, ekumeniskt och internationellt. Är man en del av samhället så har man rätt att göra sin röst hörd,
och Svenska kyrkan har mycket att bidra med i frågan.” As quoted in https://www.visk.info/2022/04/20/intervjui-kyrkans-tidning-visk-vill-stoppa-natoanslutning-45947545
[accessed
25/8/22];
see
also
https://www.visk.info/v%C3%A5r-politik-10583139 [accessed 25/8/22].
13
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disappointment at the result of the survey, and, repeating a phrase much used in Swedish
Christian circles, declares her belief that “peace is the way to peace.” 15
Spearheaded by former Church of Sweden Archbishop K. G. Hammar, the Christian Peace
Movement (Kristna fredsrörelsen) has been the one Christian grouping voicing the most vocal
opposition towards Sweden’s change in defense policy. 16 In a recent article, the general
secretary of this ecumenical body, expressed bewilderment in a new situation and a sense of
disappointment at the way in which leading Swedish politicians have dealt with the entire issue.
Sweden’s neutrality has long been a point of departure for the Christian Peace Movement when
working for reconciliation:
Where can we find solid ground if Sweden is no longer neutral but a part of NATO?
Where can we find hope for a new security order which is a path to peace? How can we
as a popular movement of the people (Sw. folkrörelse) navigate when questions which
require a considerable democratic anchoring turns intro quick governmental decisions,
unthinkable before the war in Ukraine escalated. 17
Besides these statements of opinion, public comments on the NATO-question on the part of
the Swedish churches have been few and far between. It should be noted that there have been
no official statements coming from representatives of the Roman Catholic Church or of the
Orthodox Christian communities (some of which, of course, have been fundamentally affected
by the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine). 18 So far, the Swedish bid to join NATO has
not been ratified, but there is little to suggest that the Swedish churches will alter their opinions
or express any other views than those presented above in the foreseeable future. Just like the
rest of the population, Swedish Christians remain fundamentally divided in their opinions about
the best way to arrange Sweden’s relationship to NATO. But the responses on the part of the
churches also seem to hark back to bygone ages. National defense and foreign policy remain,
in a country for centuries fundamentally shaped by Lutheran doctrine concerning the division

“Fred är vägen till fred”, see https://www.sandaren.se/taxonomy/term/1678 [accessed 30/8/22].
https://www.kyrkanstidning.se/nyhet/fredrörelsen-besviken-efter-beslut-om-ansökan [accessed 25/8/22]. See
also https://www.sandaren.se/nyhet/kg-hammar-det-blir-inte-fred-om-man-rustar-krig [accessed 25/8/22]; and K.
G. Hammar, (2021). Lilla fredsboken: om att vara följare till Jesus på fredens väg. Stockholm: Verbum.
17
“Vad ska vi ta spjärn mot om Sverige snart inte längre är alliansfritt utan en del av NATO? Var ska vi hitta
hoppet om en förändring som leder till en säkerhetspolitik för fred? Hur ska vi som folkrörelse navigera när frågor
som kräver bred demokratisk förankring blir snabba regeringsbeslut som var otänkbara alternativ innan kriget i
Ukraina eskalerade?”, https://krf.se/wp-content/uploads/20220613_Fredsnytt_1_2022_webb.pdf (krf.se)
[accessed 25/8/22].
18
Without conducting interviews of individual members of congregations, the situation is actually difficult to
assess.
There
have,
however,
been
occasional
confrontations,
see
http://www.ryskaortodoxakyrkan.se/3/uttalande.html [accessed 6/9/22].
15
16
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between faith and politics, a matter for the political realm. A tense and potentially threatening
geopolitical situation tends to reinforce long cherished views.
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